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Abstract
This article discusses the every-day family life in  ancient Rome and its functioning 
throughout the period of royal, republican, and imperial Rome. The article draws atten-
tion to the roles played by Roman family members of antiquity. Positive values cultivated 
by the ancient family, which are outlined in this essay, might provide a way to under-
stand Roman antiquity through the contemporary lens and provide a postulate of the 
reflexive human nature in this respect.
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The word “culture” is  derived from Latin and its original meaning could 
be  translated to  “cultivating the tillage” or  “preparing the earth for crops.” 
Later on, the word “agriculture” carried a similar meaning. As early as during 
Cicero’s lifetime, the term “culture” was used metonymically to  indicate the 
culture of  the soul  – “animi cultura”  – understood as  the ennobling of  the 
human mind through philosophy. This definition of  the word “cultura” was 
a continuation of a  term named as “paideia” throughout antiquity. “Cultura” 
was a comprehensive cultivation and upbringing of people understood both 
as individual and social beings.
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J. G. Herder redefined the contemporary understanding of the term “cul-
ture” as the fruit of individual and social life. The lifestyle of Europe’s peoples, 
understood in a similar manner, began to be referred to as “civilization”. This 
also meant the improvement of human life based on the example of Roman 
citizens “civis romanus” who enjoyed the right to personal development and the 
convenience connected with living in the city – Rome (Urbs). Thus, the term 
“civilization,” particularly among members of Francophone and Anglophone 
countries, was synonymous to the word “culture”. Civilization or “urbanitas” 
used in reference to Rome’s customs indicated nobleness of behaviour and, 
in a general sense, was interchangeable with the word “culture.”1The cultures 
of ancient Greece and Rome were examples of civilizations which passed but, 
in fact, they still resonate with contemporary culture in a broader sense.
Theology emphasizes the autonomic dimension of culture and stresses its 
dependence on God by means of considering culture as an object of redemption 
and underlines the mediating and cooperative role that it plays in the process 
of human salvation.2
The definition of the word “human” and the concept of “humanism” entail 
certain unchangeable value. This quality was distinguished by a highly acclaimed 
scholar of antiquity and classicist Lidia Winniczuk. She draws her conclusions 
from the assertion made by B. Suchodolski: “It cannot be denied that in the 
whole idea of a human, and the whole concept of humanism, one can find some 
quality of permanence. One also cannot ignore the fact that this unchangeable 
value always appears at a designated place and time, and that its well-determined 
existence is enforced by its permanent value not only by means of introducing 
new elements but also by preserving the long-lasting characteristics. Human 
beings always exist ‘here and now’ and this very form of their existence is at 
least as crucial for establishing the essence of humanism as the conception that 
this essence is dictated by historical determinants.”3
Thus, culture is anchored to the metaphysical structure of the human, as it 
was reminded during the Second Vatican Council and in the statements made 
by the Magisterium of the Church later on.
 1 Cf. M. A. Krąpiec, Człowiek i kultura, Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, Lublin 
2008, pp. 9–11.
 2 Cf. D. Capała, Encyklopedia Katolicka, tom 10, Lublin 2004, kol. 1888.
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These documents put emphasis on several significant aspects, thanks to which 
it was possible to understand the humanist and universal characteristics of cul-
ture, and its roots in history and within a given human-inhabited environment. 
The Second Vatican Council notices the roots of culture as a crucial link between 
a human and the essence of inter-human relationships, so called “humanum.”4
Professor Michał Heller notices the similarity of culture with transience in its 
historical and theological dimension: “One of the deepest human experiences 
is the experience of transience. (…) From the theological perspective, transience 
ceases to be a dramatic end for a human and humanity but is characterized 
by opening a new beginning for an individual. The task for a man as a creator 
of culture is to help cope with transience and due to that fact his work of creation 
is not doomed to destruction. It simply takes part in the process of creating the 
world.”5 Bishop Jerzy Życiński asserts that the negation of culture founds its 
representation in the demoralization of humankind, which can be manifested, 
for instance, in the process of abortion. Book of Genesis reveals this “a-histo-
ricity” entirely by using the following words: “So God created mankind in his 
own image, in the image of God he created them, male and female he created 
them.” (Gen. 1, 27). The key for understanding the universality of humanism 
in its enduring aspect finds its final fulfillment in Jesus Christ in whom people 
find the grace of God that offers salvation to all people – “apparuit benignitas 
et humanitas, Salvatoris nostri Dei” (Titus 2, 11).
The expression “humanitas” entails an extraordinarily rich reality: human-
ness, human nature, humanist approach to a given person, kindness, politeness, 
education, and propriety.6
Greek equivalents of Latin “humanitas” include: “antropotes” – humanness, 
“anthropopatheia” – human sensitivity, “paideia” – upbringing, “kalokagathia” – 
beauty stemming from grace, and “prepon” – tact.7
Regarding the meaning of the word “humanitas” two well-known maxims 
are worth mentioning: “What a graceful being a man is when he is human”;8 
 4 Gaudium et spes 3.
 5 M. Heller, Przemijanie i kultura, in: Teologia, kultura, współczesność, ed. Z. Adamek, 
Tarnów 1995, pp. 7–10.
 6 Cf. L. Winniczuk, Ludzie, zwyczaje i obyczaje…, p. 7.
 7 L. Winniczuk, Ludzie, zwyczaje i obyczaje…, p. 7.
 8 Menander in: Odpowiednie dać rzeczy słowo, eds. J. Nowak, M. Rzepka, Tarnów 2016, 
p. 125.
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“Homo sum; et humani nil a me alienum puto” - “I am human, and I think noth-
ing human is alien to me.”9
Positive features which we notice in personal relations as well as in family, 
social, and international circles among ancient Greeks, are in line with ethical 
advice and rules given by ancient Romans which can be summarized in the 
words “treat the others the way you want them to treat you.” This message 
is found in Roman maxims such as “Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris” – 
what you would not have done to yourselves, never do unto others (Alexander 
Severus);10 “Si vis amari, ama” – love the way you want to be loved (Seneca);11 
“Ut salutabis, ita solutaberis” –greet the way you want to be greeted (an ancient 
proverb). Those rules can also be applied in the context of Roman family which 
is the subject of this article.
The most distinguished Latin orator and ancient prose author, Marcus Tul-
lius Cicero (106–43 BC) in his treatise entitled “On Duties” (De officiis), which 
is written in the form of a letter to his son, states that household serves as the 
micro version of the state, and the family is “the seedbed of the state” (principium 
urbis et quasi seminarium rei publicae).12
According to Cicero, an element which links this peculiar micro city-state 
is love.
Cicero claims that love is manifested in such virtues as kindness, friendship, 
justice, nobleness, brings people together and makes them alike in shared good 
patterns of behaviour and character. He states that “there are several degrees 
of relationship among men. To take our departure from the tie of common 
humanity, of which I have spoken, there is a nearer relation of race, nation, and 
language, which brings men into a very close community of feeling. It is a still 
more intimate bond to belong to the same city; for the inhabitants of a city have 
in common among themselves forum, temples, public walks, streets, laws, rights, 
courts, modes and places of voting, beside companionships and intimacies, en-
gagements and contracts, of many with many. Closer still is the tie of kindred; 
for by this from the vast society of the human race one is shut up into a small 
 9 Terence, Heautontimorumenos, I 1, 25. Cf. S. Sojka, Imitatio et kontemplatio Christi, 
Kraków 2006, pp. 27–28.
 10 According to Rampadrios.
 11 Seneca, Epistulaemorales od Lucilium, 9, (I, 9) 6.
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and narrow circle. Indeed, since the desire of producing offspring is common 
by nature to all living creatures, the nearest association consists in the union 
of the sexes; the next, in the relation with children; then, that of a common 
home and a community of such goods as appertain to the home. Then the home 
is the germ of the city, and, so to speak, the nursery of the state. The union 
of brothers comes next in order, then that of cousins less or more remote, who, 
when one house can no longer hold them all, emigrate to other houses as if 
to colonies. Then follow marriages and affinities by marriage, thus increasing 
the number of kindred. From this propagation and fresh growth of successive 
generations states have their beginning. But the union of blood, especially, binds 
men in mutual kindness and affection; for it is a great thing to have the same 
statues of ancestors, the same rites of domestic worship, the same sepulchres. 
But of all associations none is more excellent, none more enduring, than when 
good men, of like character, are united in intimacy. For the moral rectitude 
of which I have so often spoken, even if we see it in a stranger, yet moves us, 
and calls out our friendship for him in whom it dwells. Moreover, while every 
virtue attracts us to itself, and makes us love those in whom it seems to exist, 
this is emphatically true of justice and generosity. At the same time, nothing 
is more lovable, and nothing brings men into more intimate relations, than the 
common possession of these moral excellences; for those who have the same 
virtuous desires and purposes love one another as they love themselves, and they 
realize what Pythagoras would have in friendship, the unifying of plurality. That 
also is an intimate fellowship which is created by benefits mutually bestowed 
and received, which, while they give pleasure on both sides, produce a lasting 
attachment between those who thus live in reciprocal good offices. But when 
you survey with reason and judgment the entire field of human society, of all as-
sociations none is closer, none dearer, than that which unites each of us with our 
country. Parents are dear, children are dear, so are kindred and friends; but the 
country alone takes into her embrace all our loves for all, in whose behalf what 
good man would hesitate to encounter death, if he might thus do her service? 
The more detestable is the savageness of those who by every form of guilt have 
inflicted grievous wounds on their country, and are and have been employed 
in her utter subversion. Now, if you make an estimate and comparison of the de-
gree of service to be rendered in each relation, the first place must be given to our 
country and our parents, bound as we are to them by paramount benefits; next 
come our children, and the entire family which looks to us alone, nor in stress 
of need can have any other refuge; then, afterward, the kindred with whom 
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we are on pleasant terms, and with whom, for the most part, we are in the same 
condition of life. For the reasons indicated we owe chiefly to these that I have 
named the necessary protection of daily life; but companionship, conviviality, 
counsel, conversation, advice, consolation, sometimes reproof also, have their 
most fruitful soil in friendship, and that is the most pleasant friendship which 
is cemented by resemblance in character.”13
The term family (familia) in Roman sources viewed from a legal perspec-
tive had a broader meaning than we usually think. From its very beginning, 
it constituted a strong and well-organized social unit. This community was 
comprised of a father and a mother, sons and unmarried daughters, wives and 
son’s children, slaves, and married daughters sine conventione in manum (the 
wives who legally and ritually remained members of their fathers’ families).14
There were three forms of entering the family community under the control 
of the father (conventio in manum patris familias): by giving birth to a child 
of the marriage acknowledged by law and thus introducing that child to the 
family; by adoption (adoptio) yet the adopted child either remained indepen-
dent (sui iuris) or was under the control of the family’s father (arrogatio); or by 
passing control over the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law.15
The role of the head of the family was held by the father (pater familias) 
and legally he was the only family member who was entirely independent from 
anyone (suiiuris). The remaining members of the family were under his author-
ity (alieno iuri subiecti). The father’s control was three-fold: it comprised the 
control over the wife (manus), the power over children (patria potestas), and 
the control over slaves (dominica potestas).
The power over the wife stemmed from matrimony. The moment marriage 
was concluded, a woman was no longer under the control of her father or coun-
sellor since when she entered married life, she automatically became the member 
of her husband’s family and was under his authority (conventio in manum). 
In her new family, a woman would obtain the rights of a daughter.
Initially, Roman legislation granted full and unlimited power to the father. 
Due to a substantial number of those rights and its diversity, they can be divided 
into three groups, in which the father appears as the master of family ownerships 
 13 M. T. Cicero, De officiis, 1, 17, 53–56,in: Cyceron, Pismafilozoficzne, pp. 355–357.
 14 Cf. L. Winniczuk, Ludzie, zwyczaje i obyczaje…, p. 232.
 15 Cf. L. Winniczuk, Ludzie, zwyczaje i obyczaje…, p. 232.
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and as an authority.16 The father would play the role of a priest of the hearth 
and performed rites of cult, by imitating his ancestors in this respect, and was 
not under any external control. His decisions could be altered or challenged 
neither by priests nor the society. As the religious superior, he would protect the 
continuant durability of cult and family. This strictly entailed the following laws:
 ▪ The right to acknowledge or reject a child after it was born. This 
kind of law was granted to both Roman and Greek fathers. The right 
is considered unnatural from the contemporary perspective, yet it was 
not regarded as contradictory to former rules of family life. The very 
origin of the child, even unquestioned by the family environment, 
was not perceived as a criterion relevant to the discussion whether 
a newborn can be acknowledged and accepted into the family or not. 
The necessary condition was the father’s decision to acknowledge the 
child and introducing it to the family cult. As long as the child did not 
participate in the rites of family cult, it was not considered relevant for 
its father.
 ▪  The right to dismiss a wife due to the woman’s infertility or the act 
of infidelity committed by her.
 ▪ The right to marry off a daughter which meant waiving the control 
over the daughter that was initially granted by the fact of being her 
father.
 ▪ The right to marry off a son.
 ▪ The right of emancipation which meant excluding the son from the 
family and family’s cult.
 ▪ The right to adopt a child by accepting an alien child in the family.
 ▪ The right of succession in case of death of the wife’s and children’s 
guardian.
The rights above were only granted to the family’s father.
The wife did not have the right to file for divorce and she could not emanci-
pate or adopt children even after her husband’s death. In the case of a divorce, 
children would remain under the control of the father.
Family property was initially considered as ownership which belonged 
to all family. The father, as the head of the family, used to hold the authority 
 16 Cf. P. Guirand, Rzym. Życie prywatne i publiczne Rzymian, przeł. J. L. Popławski, 
Warszawa 1896, p. 97.
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in the “household tribunal” which formed judgments on the basis of husband’s 
or  father’s power with the help of household gods.17
The father of the family granted the right to life and death against his children 
(ius vitae necisque). Also, he could decide on the fortune of family members 
whom he controlled. In addition, similarly to laws of Greek legislation, he could 
acknowledge a child born of his marriage and accept it into the family or reject 
and abandon it which often equaled sentencing the child to death when nobody 
would take care of the abandoned newborn.18
Over time “ius vitae necisque” became alleviated and it was abolished in the 
fourth century BC.19 As already mentioned, occasionally a father would waive 
his control over the son (emancipatio) or transfer his power over him onto 
somebody else by adoption (adoptio). Those kinds of practices no longer existed 
in royal times.20
According to Roman legislation, slaves were not considered as persons but 
property (res muncipii). The owner could decide on everything that was related 
to his slaves or even kill them. Slaves were not allowed to marry (matrimonium). 
Occasionally, the owner wouldliberate a slave from his control (manumissio) 
but the slave took his owner’s name (“nomen” and “praenomen”). In this context 
it is worth mentioning the statement made by one of the most distinguished 
scholars of ancient culture in Poland, T. Zieliński. He claimed that “slavery 
in its old form, that is such kind of system due to which one person as a ‘slave’ 
becomes a ‘property’ for somebody else, his master, can be found only among 
savages. That type of slavery was a product of particular primitive conditions 
of social life. The ancient cultural world of Rome and Greece inherited this type 
of system from its forefathers from the primeval times and in this respect, it is 
no different from other ancient civilizations. The difference, though, stemmed 
from the fact that it was first their best poets and philosophers, and later Roman 
and Greek legislation and jurisdiction authorities followed by citizens themselves 
who condemned the practice of slavery. Thus, it is thanks to the antiquity that 
contemporary people believe that slavery is truly shameful. The main source 
of slavery was the conception that legal relationships exist only among citizens 
 17 Cf. P. Guirand, Rzym.., p. 98–99.
 18 Cf. L. Winniczuk, Ludzie, zwyczaje i obyczaje…, p. 233.
 19 Cf. L. Winniczuk, Ludzie, zwyczaje i obyczaje…, p. 233.
 20 Cf. A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina grecka i rzymska, „Vox Patrum” (1985), z. 8–9, p. 36.
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or allies and not among enemies – thus, in case of a victory, the defeated and 
their wealth become the property of the victors.21
The manifestation of the functions of a father in a family is included in royal 
legislations (lex, legis). Dionysus in “Roman Antiquities” notes that “Romulus 
imposed a law upon his citizens that they would support all of their progeny 
of male kind and all first-born daughters and forbade killing offspring under 
the age of 3.”22 Those fathers who did not abide to royal bills were punished, for 
instance by expropriation of half of their wealth.
That royal legislation (lex regis) limited parental power over their children 
(potestas patria). Fathers used to have the right to life and death over them (ius 
vitae necisque). The royal bill deprived the father of the right to the decision 
about accepting a newborn into the family or its rejection (ius tollendi). It for-
bade abandoning children which equaled their imminent death. Neither could 
the father kill his male offspring and first-born daughters nor sell them. Also, 
the refusal to pay alimonies was considered similar to killing a child.
According to the royal legislation, the father could incarcerate his children 
of both sexes (filios),23 could inflict physical punishments upon children of his 
inferiors (verberatio) but he was not allowed to lash them (flagris caedere). 
When the father intended to deprive his inferiors of their lives, he was allowed 
to do that only in front of witnesses.24 The father could dispense justice from his 
son, including the act of killing the child but he was not allowed to do it at will.25 
According to Servius Tullius, when a son physically assaulted his father, he be-
came denounced by the family (saceresto)26 and the father was allowed to kill 
his son if he was able to gather witnesses of that act. Similarly, when the hus-
band demanded to kill his wife, he had to convene a meeting with her relatives 
and perform an investigation in their presence.27 Throughout the royal times, 
the father could not free his sons from his control (emancipatio) or hand over 
that control to another citizen by means of adoption (adoptio). A permission 
 21 T. Zieliński, Rzeczpospolita rzymska, Warszawa 1958, p. 372.
 22 Cf. A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina…, p. 38.
 23 Cf. A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina…, p. 38.
 24 T. Liwiusz, Dzieje Rzymu od założenia miasta, 1, 26, przek. A. Kościółek, Warszawa – 
Wrocław – Kraków 1968, p. 35.
 25 Cf. A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina…, p. 38.
 26 Cf. A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina…, p. 38.
 27 Cf. A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina…, p. 38.
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from the Roman nation was required to disinherit a child (exheradatio).28 Also, 
banishing a child was not allowed. However, the punishment by selling a son 
trans Tiberim is neither a proven nor a probable practice. The father was al-
lowed to sell a child only in case of extreme poverty so as to support and save 
the whole family.29
In the republican period, the royal bill concerning abandoning children was 
not legally waived. Fathers of families could regain their original authority only 
in that respect. The control over family life and fulfilling patriae potestatis was ex-
ecuted first by consuls and later by censors.30This topic was addressed by Terence 
and Plautus in their works. Plautus’ comedy does not indicate clearly that during 
his lifetime Roman fathers of families were allowed to abandon or kill newborns. 
Also Cicero, who in “De legibus” devotes his attention to the topic of family, 
does not write about father’s legal right to remove healthy offspring.31 When 
Senecain “Controversiae” discusses the case of an abandoned child he notes 
that the father might desire to return “the orphan” if the costs of its upbringing 
are evened.32In that collection of judicial speeches Seneca tackles the problem 
of children abandoned by their fathers and later found so mutilated by beggars 
that they were impossible to be recognized by the father and recovered.33 Based 
on quoted statements, Seneca stated that the father did not hold the authority 
to abandon a child (expositio), however, in case of committing that act he did 
not lose the parental authority over that offspring (patria potestas).
Authors of antiquity do not provide arguments allowing to draw a conclu-
sion that in republican Rome the father of a family was allowed to kill healthy 
and legitimate children who were born in conducive circumstances. Any right 
of that kind was granted neither by law nor public opinion.34 What is more, 
other literary sources devoted to the Principate or the Roman Empire do not 
indicate that fathers had the right to abandon their newborns.
 28 Cf. B. Łapicki, Władza ojcowska w starożytnym Rzymie. Czasy królewskie i republikańskie, 
Warszawa 1933, pp. 31–34.
 29 Cf. B. Łapicki, Władza ojcowska w starożytnym Rzymie. Czasy królewskie i republikańskie, 
Warszawa 1933, pp. 48–51.
 30 Cf. A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina…, p. 39.
 31 Cicero, De legibus III 9, 19, in: Cyceron, Pisma…, p. 295.
 32 Cf. A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina…, p. 40.
 33 Cf. A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina…, p. 40.
 34 Cf. P. Guirand, Rzym…, p. 102.
293
Stanisław Sojka
The Ancient Roman Family…
Suetonius in “De vita Caesarum” while describing the life of Augustus35 
or Gaius Plinius Secundus in his letter to Trajan36 seem to deny the existence 
of such laws.
Interestingly, there are documents demonstrating that in the republican 
period not only newborns but also children conceived were under legal pro-
tection. The Praetor’s Edict granted the legal support and family wealth for 
children born after their father’s death.37 This matter is described in Cicero’s 
speech in defense of Aulus Cluentius Habitus who accused his stepfather Statius 
Albius Oppianicus of an attempt to poison him. In that speech, Cicero mentions 
the issue of three attempted abortions which were not successful. The orator 
claims that Oppianicus poisoned his pregnant sister-in-law at the time when 
her husband was still alive and he adds that “„(…) illud, quod errat ex fratre 
conceptum,necaretur. (…) Ceteri non videntur in singulis hominibus multa 
parricidia suscipere posse, Oppianicus inventus est qui in uno corpore pluris 
necaret.”38 To justify his crime (scelus) Oppianicus refers to a situation which 
took place in Anatolia during his proconsulate. The case pertained to a widow 
who aborted a child after her husband’s death. Her deed was considered a major 
crime and she received a death sentence “rei capitalis esse damnatam.”39 That 
harsh judgment is explained in the following way: “nec iniuria, quae spem pa-
rentis, mempriam nominis, subsydium generis, heredem familiae, designatum 
rei publicae civem sustulisset.”40
The orator, referring to Oppianicus’ case, accuses him of a new crime, namely 
the act of stealing wealth after his relative (avunculus), Magius who on death’s 
bed bequeathed substantial wealth to his conceived child. Meanwhile, Oppia-
nicus encouraged the widow to abort the child and only five months after her 
late husband’s death, he married that widow. Their marital relations were not 
long-lasting though as “it was not strengthened by the sanctity of marital dignity 
 35 Suetonius, De  vita Caesarum. Augustus, w:  Swetoniusz, Żywoty cezarów, przeł. 
J. Niemirska-Pliszczyńska, Wrocław 1969, p. 150–154.
 36 Cf. A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina…, p. 41.
 37 Servius Sulpicius, D 37, 9, 1, 24: „cura et bonorum possesio ventris nomine”, in: B. Łapicki, 
Władza ojcowska, p. 103.
 38 Cf. A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina…, p. 42.
 39 A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina…, p. 42.
 40 A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina…, p. 42.
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but criminal cooperation.”41 In the murder of an unborn child, Cicero stressed 
the particularly shameful criminal cooperation (societas sceleris) of Oppianicus 
and the mother. The orator highlighted the very advanced process of degenera-
tion and demoralization of wealthy citizens and the problem of breaking the 
laws of the republican period.42
Titus Livius reports that as early as during the republican times, certain 
general principle of “patrem sequuntur liberi” became accepted.43 The child’s 
belonging to a family was dictated by its origin – depending on whether it was 
a legitimate child or not. A father’s acknowledging of a child and accepting 
a newborn into the family (tollere et suscipere liberum) lost its original mean-
ing and its value was merely that of a symbol.
During that period, the father’s responsibility included not only acknowledg-
ing the child but primarily the process of its upbringing and supporting him 
or her financially.44 Raising infants was aimed at developing them in terms 
of their morals and teaching about the law (instituere). This process depended 
on promoting rules of sensitivity and moral purity (pudicita, castitas), honesty, 
and faithfulness. Children were taught about the laws and religion of their an-
cestors.45 Upbringing was also closely related to educating (erudire) children 
and adolescents. They were taught the mother tongue and introduced into basic 
principles of human life. Apart from that, adolescents were instructed with the 
intention of performing, given occupations in the future and tutored about 
the rules of social and civic life. In addition, they were being prepared for the 
economic, political, and military life.46 It was parents who played the prime role 
in the process of raising a new generation of Roman citizens.
 41 A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina…, p. 42.
 42 Cf. K. Kumaniecki, Literatura rzymska. Okres cyceroński, Warszawa 1977, p. 219–220.
 43 T. Liwiusz, Dzieje Rzymu od założenia miasta, p. 221.
 44 Cf. A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina…, p. 42.
 45 It may be said that, as heroes served as models in Greek upbringing, under the influence 
of Homer, ancestors were followed as examples in Roman upbringing. Vgl. H. J. Marrou, 
Historia wychowania w starożytności, (trans.) S. Łoś, Warszawa 1969, p. 335. However, Roman 
upbringing, as compared to its Greek counterpart, had a more civil, family character and was 
more permeated with the religious spirit. Rome did not adapt the Spartan understanding 
of upbringing. All possible measures had to be taken to save the homeland, however, not 
everything was allowed since the obligations of justice, customs and law had to be complied 
with.
 46 H. J. Marrou, Historia wychowania w starożytności, p. 325–335.
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Father’s power was controlled only when it involved persuading children 
to commit deeds considered wrong. In such circumstances it was not only the 
son’s right but also the duty to disobey his father’s orders. According to Seneca, 
all matters require a child’s full obedience, with the exception of adoption and 
when the father intends to kill a child, which is forbidden by the law.
This rule found its application in certain specific cases. A father who benefited 
financially from his children being involved in prostitution (lenocinium) was 
considered unworthy of veneration by praetors and, as a consequence, he had 
limited procedural powers. According to Julian laws (lex Iulia municipalis), 
such a crime was a legitimate reason to move a citizen to a lower class and, for 
instance, remove him from the list of senators (senatu movere). Cato, who held 
the function of a censor, removed a father from the list of senators who hugged 
his wife in the presence of his virgin-daughter. Cicero accused Verres of com-
mitting iniquity (iniuria) against his adolescent son in Sicilia because he let him 
look at acts of debauchery (voluptas) and foul deeds (flagitia et turpitudines). 
Because his children belonged not only to the family’s father but also the whole 
nation, ensuring children’s behavior was also a responsibility of the nation. If the 
process of upbringing was not in line with the interests of Roman nation, this 
meant that the father acted unfairly against his homeland.
In conclusion, it can be said that the task of the father within a family in-
cluded supporting his children financially and ensuring that they are raised 
according to the basic rules of Roman political system, morality (boni mores) 
and welfare of the state.
What is particularly interesting, is that the father held the function of the 
head of domestic religious cult. It was connected with the linguistic as well 
as the legal and historical implications of the word “father” (pater). It was used 
in reference to Roman gods and the head of the family. After his death, family’s 
father was idolized and worshipped as the guardian of home and hearth.47 When 
alive, he used to be the head of domestic cult as saying prayers and presenting 
the sacrifice (sacra privata) was his responsibility. Fathers would conduct cer-
emonies of funeral and made sure the family mourned the dead for an adequate 
period of time (tempus lugendi). In his will, he would appoint his successor and 
hand over the rules of protecting sacra privata and grant financial resources 
necessary for that purpose.48
 47 Cf. A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina…, p. 43–44.
 48 Cf. P. Guirand, Rzym…, pp. 97–105.
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As stated above, the role of  the father in  the family was fundamental. 
In  addition, the role of  the mother also carried a  great deal of  significance. 
Nevertheless, a  Roman woman, unlike Greek women, did not possess any 
civil rights as  she was removed from civil matters due to  her innate mod-
esty (pudicitia), weakness (infirmitas, fragilitas), and the lack of  knowledge 
concerning public rights (forensium rerum ignorantia). On  the other hand, 
she enjoyed more freedom than Greek women of antiquity. When a Roman 
woman married, she was no longer under the authority of her father but her 
husband. In her new family she held the position of a daughter (iliae familias 
loco). The husband did not have the right to life and death over her and he was 
not allowed to sell her or transfer power over her to somebody else. The wife 
could terminate the marriage by getting a divorce. She played a dignified role 
in the family as  she was the landlady of  the household (domina). She was 
responsible for managing the household, accompanied her husband in  his 
activities, took care of family matters, supervised the domestic staff, nurtured 
and raised children, took part in  social life, attended social gatherings and 
feasts, which was not allowed in ancient Greece. Her dependence on her father 
or husband was basically limited to finances. Over time that aspect improved 
significantly as she was given the right to choose the guardian responsible for 
finances and she could manage her dowry with the help of a skillful servant 
(servus dotalis, atriensis).49
Romans held the family in high esteem and, in order to ensure its continuity 
and integrity, they took good care of the institution of marriage. Similarly to an-
cient Greece, it was the father, along with the future in-law who decided about 
marrying off the daughter. The age of lawful consent to a marriage was 12 for 
girls and 14 for boys. The Romans distinguished between two types of marital 
relationships: lawful marriage (matrimonium iustum) and unlawful (matrimo-
nium iniustum). Matrimon iumiustum could be concluded only between two 
people of the same class who had ius connubii. For instance, such right was 
given to patricians. The Canuleia Bill (lex Canuleia) from 455 BC abolished 
the division of citizens based on their class. From then on, the only condition 
to marry was Roman citizenship. Those marriages which were concluded despite 
not fulfilling that condition were considered unlawful. As mentioned above, two 
legal forms of marriage existed in ancient Rome. The first one was connected 
 49 Cf. L. Winniczuk, Słowo jest cieniem czynu czyli starożytni Grecy i Rzymianie o sobie, 
Warszawa 1972, pp. 164–198.
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to passing the wife directly from the hand (manus) of her father to that of her 
new husband (conventio in manum) and introducing her into the new family. 
The term “manua” referred to rights which were granted to the head of the family. 
In the second form of marriage, the wife was legally under the control of her 
father (in potestate patris, sine conventione in manum). Their children would 
be under the authority of the father but the wife herself was not subject to his 
legal power. The legal basis for a Roman marriage was ensured by the mutual 
agreement for intimate liaison (affectio maritalia).
The so called “conventio marriage” (cum conventione in manum) could come 
to fruition in one of the three forms. The first one included the symbolic act 
of “purchasing” the bride but she had to give her consent. The last time we learn 
about this form is during Tiberius’ lifetime. The second form included using the 
marital rights (ex usu). This form entailed a woman’s and man’s cohabitation 
for the period of one year as long as she did not spend three consecutive nights 
away from home. By common law, such men and women became husbands and 
wives. After the year 445 BC such practice of concluding a sacrament of marriage 
became obsolete. It was entirely liquidated by the emperor Augustus. The last 
form of marriage (confarreatio), along with its legal basis, entailed the religious 
and more ceremonial aspects.
According to Roman tradition, newlyweds would provide Jupiter with an of-
fering of a cake of spelt (panis farreus) as he was the guardian of seed (farreus). 
That cake was eaten by the married couple and their wedding guests. A dis-
tinguished Roman historian, Pliny writes about that practice in his “Natural 
History”: “There was no other ceremony more festive than a wedding sealed 
by seed offering where a spelt cake was carried before the bride. That sacrifice 
was called confarreatio and was the most solemn and binding form of wedding 
which was accompanied by the chief priest.”50
The ceremony of wedding was preceded by engagement (sponsalia), which 
was an oral vow. Although the choice of a husband was made by the daughter’s 
father, there was a fundamental difference when it comes to that consent between 
Greek and Roman marriages. In Greece, it was girl’s father, or the guardian if she 
was orphaned, who gave consent on behalf of the bride-to-be. In Rome, the 
fiancée herself answered the engagement question and made her promise. The 
 50 Pliniusz, Historia naturalna 18, 19–20, trans. I. i T. Zawadzcy, Wrocław-Kraków 1961, 
p. 191.
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engagement was concluded by the following words: “Spondense? – Spondeo” 
which could be translated to “Do you promise? I promise.”51
The ceremony of wedding was no less solemn. The day before the wedding 
a girl would take off her pristine garments (toga praetexta) and put on a white, 
straight toga dress (togam puram), which was more appropriate considering 
her new marital status. The unfitted toga (tunicam rectam) was tied at the waist 
with a girdle. She wore the flammeum or croceum, a flame or saffron colored 
transparent veil which revealed parts of her hair, face, and shoulders. Only 
brides would wear a colored veil which covered their bodies that is why the 
wedding ceremony was named after the words “nuptiae” and “nubere” which 
means to hide, to cover.52
The day of the wedding ceremony began with watching for good omens which 
meant interpreting the flights of birds or examining the liver, lungs and entrails 
of animals sacrifice. After that, a hog, sheep or goat were sacrificed as they are 
animals symbolizing the goddesses of fertility and the earth, Ceres and Terra. 
Next, the family and guests prayed to guardian gods of marriage. After the reli-
gious ceremonies, the feast began (cena nuptialis) in the bride’s household. The 
matron of honor, or the pronuba, would introduce the newly-wedded wife to the 
family. The role of pronuba could be held by a woman of great dignity who was 
faithful to his wife for the entire life (univira). It was she who accompanied the 
bride during fortune-telling, passed the bride from the hands of the father to her 
new husband by joining their hands (dextrarum iunctio). After the feast in the 
evening, when the Versper, Venus’ star, appeared in the sky, the official procession 
from fiancées’ household to her husband’s home took place (deduction domum). 
The procession was particularly interesting as it was headed by a happy boy (pat-
rimus et matrimus) carrying a blackthorn torch (spina alba). He was followed 
by two boys who could not be orphans and who led the bride to the groom’s home. 
Behind them there was a party of servants who carried symbols of household 
work and domestic life and were followed by the family, friends, acquaintances 
and others. The procession included singing and music. Humorous chants were 
sang (fescenninae) to make the walk even more pleasant. The groom greeted 
the wife in his household and she would say the sacramental “Ubitu Caius, ibi 
 51 Cf. O.  Jurewicz, L.  Winniczuk, Starożytni Grecy i  Rzymianie w  życiu prywatnym 
i państwowym, Warszawa 1973, p. 20.
 52 Cf. P. Guirand, Rzym…, p. 86.
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ego Caia” to symbolize the moment.53 This statement was of great significance 
as the married linked the two for better and for worse, for life on earth and in the 
Proserpina’s land of shadows. After saying “as you are Gaius, I am Gaia,” she would 
anoint the door of the household with a hog’s or wolf ’s fat in order to ward off 
the evil spirits from the house which she entered as future mater familias. She 
also decorated the doors with ribbons. A hog symbolized Ceres and wolf – Mars 
who was the god of war but also an agricultural guardian. The young wife was 
lifted over the household threshold by boys to avoid her potential stumbling, 
which was considered a bad omen,54 and her husband greeted her with water 
and fire. Water symbolized purification and fire signified the common domestic 
hearth guarded by mater familias. Finally, pronuba helped the wife enter the 
atrium where the mater-familias-to-be devoted her prayers on family matters 
to the guardian god, Genius. The next day featured an after-wedding celebra-
tion (repotia) which, apart from the feast, included making sacrifices to gods.
Delving deeper into the essence of the form of the marital institution, one 
might come to the conclusion that Romans perceived the inseparability of spous-
es’ fortunes as the only moral rule of relationship between man and a woman 
and the ethical law which sanctifies monogamy.
In the imperial period, due to the general process of loosening manners 
and morals, women enjoyed more freedom. Fathers no longer chose husbands 
for their daughters and the latter could manage their finances independently. 
This state of affairs caused the increase in the number of divorces. It is believed 
that the first divorce took place in the year 231 BC. Near the end of the republic, 
divorces became widespread. The motivation behind filing for a divorce varied: 
from serious matters such as a wife’s infidelity to trivial reasons including the 
wife’s visiting public spaces with her face uncovered. The so called “Julian laws” 
were aimed at limiting the number of divorces by means of constraining the 
right to divorce. They were viewed as the Roman legislative way of defending 
the significance and sanctity of the domestic hearth. According to Ludwik Hi-
eronim Morstin, Roman citizens held family life in high esteem and the mother 
was considered the greatest holiness that the world has who is able to unite not 
only the family but also the citizens, and the whole nation.55
 53 M. Żołnierczuk, Zarys prawa rzymskiego, Lublin 1998, p. 112.
 54 Cf. K. Kumaniecki, Historia kultury starożytnej Grecji i Rzymu, Warszawa 1975, p. 398.
 55 Cf. L. H. Morstin, W kraju Latynów, Warszawa 1956, pp. 154–155.
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One way to conclude the analyses of texts pertaining to the family life in an-
cient Rome is to quote an outstanding scholar of antiquity, philologist, and 
theologian, Augustin Eckmann whose pertinent observations can be found 
throughout this article. He states that “a Roman pre-Christian family was pa-
triarchal and monogamous. It depended on a variety of legal laws. The family 
members included the father, the mother, sons and unmarried daughters, sons’ 
wives and children, slaves, and married daughters who concluded their mar-
riages without passing the control from the father to their husbands. The father 
held the position of the head of the family and was entirely independent. The 
remaining family members were under his authority. The parental power was 
threefold as he controlled his wife, children, and servants. He had the right 
to life and death over his children in the first, primeval period but he was de-
prived of this law in the royal period as well as the following periods of republic, 
principate, and empire. In the republican period, the responsibility of the father 
included supporting children financially and raising them according to the rules 
of the system and morality and for the welfare of the state. Slaves were treated 
as objects. The owner wielded the right to liberate a slave from his authority. 
Another responsibility of the father was connected to performing the practices 
of the domestic religious cult. The wife was subordinate to her husband. She 
was not his slave but his life companion and the landlady. In this way, the Ro-
man legislation protected the sanctity of the marital institution, protected the 
life of healthy newborns as well as the life of conceived but yet unborn children 
by means of ensuring their rights to family wealth after the death of the father. 
In a way, all these laid the foundation for accepting Christianity by Roman 
families.”56
In the context of what has been said about the culture of antiquity, it seems 
relevant to address the question connected to perfections and imperfections 
of that culture viewed by its contemporary inheritors. The answer to that ques-
tion to some degree can be found in the following commentary by L. Winniczuk 
quoted in this article earlier on. She said: “The ancient Greece and Rome have 
been subject to fascination of the whole world for the entire centuries. The 
perfection of Greek thought which taught us how to find beauty was and still 
is an object of awe. Also, the perfection or Romans as citizens, heroes, and law-
yers is admired to this day. But was this perfection deprived from any shades 
or imperfections? Are stories of various antagonisms, intrigues, crimes, and 
 56 A. Eckmann, Starożytna rodzina…, p. 49.
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murders absent in that heritage? What about slavery? What about the attitude 
towards the impoverished who were forced to sell themselves to the rich so as 
to pay off their debts? What about the cases of infanticide facilitated by the laws 
allowing to abandon newborns? (…) The reason why we take our academic 
interest in the culture of ancient Greece and Rome is not that it was ‘ultimately 
perfect’ but thanks to its imperfections paved the way for the perfection of the 
following centuries.”57 Bearing in mind the positive aspects connected to family 
values protected by ancient Romans, it can be said that the culture of antiquity 
appears as “pedagogus in Christum” (see. Gal 3, 24)58 in this respect.
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